We develop a Savage-type model of choice under uncertainty in which agents identify uncertain prospects with subjective compound lotteries. Our theory permits issue preference; that is, agents may not be indifferent among gambles that yield the same probability distribution if they depend on different issues. Hence, we establish subjective foundations for the Anscombe-Aumann framework and other models with two different types of probabilities. We define second-order risk as risk that resolves in the first stage of the compound lottery and show that uncertainty aversion implies aversion to second-order risk which implies issue preference and behavior consistent with the Ellsberg paradox.
Introduction
What distinguishes the Ellsberg paradox from the Allais Paradox and other related violations of subjective expected utility theory is the fact that Ellsberg paradox type behavior cannot be explained within a model of choice among lotteries. That is, the Ellsberg paradox calls into question not only subjective expected utility theory but all models of choice under uncertainty that postulate behavior based on reducing uncertainty to risk.
The following "mini" version is useful for understanding our interpretation and resolution of the Ellsberg Paradox. An experimental subject is presented with an urn. He is told that the urn contains three balls, one of which is red. The remaining balls are either green or white. A ball will be drawn from the urn at random. The decision-maker is asked to choose between a bet that yields $100 if a green ball is drawn and 0 dollars otherwise and a bet that yields $100 if a red ball is drawn and 0 dollars otherwise.
Before the ball is drawn, the decision-maker is asked his preference over two other bets. In one bet he is to receive $100 if either a green or a white ball is drawn and 0 if a red ball is drawn. With the other option, the decision-maker gets $100 if either a red or a white ball is drawn and 0 if a green ball is drawn. We depict these bets as follows: to f , the decision-maker is revealing his subjective assessment that there is a higher chance of a red ball being drawn then a green ball. Similarly, by revealing a preference for f over h , the decision-maker is expressing his belief that the event "green or white" is more likely than "red or white". If the decision-maker's assessments of the likelihoods of G, W and R could be described by some probability μ, and if we assume that the decision-maker prefers a greater chance of winning $100 to a smaller chance of winning $100, we would conclude from the choices above that μ(R) > μ(G) and μ(G ∪ W ) > μ(R ∪ W ). Since, G, W, R are mutually exclusive events, no such probability exists, hence the paradox.
One intuitive explanation of the above behavior is the following: the decision-maker finds it difficult to associate unique probabilities with the events G, W, R∪G and R∪W . In contrast, the probability of the events R is 1 3 and hence the probability of the event G ∪ W is 2 3 . The ambiguity of the events G, W makes the agent behave as if each of these events is less likely than R when they are associated with good prizes but more likely than R when associated with bad prizes. Consequently, the agent can prefer h to f and f to h . We call this interpretation of the Ellsberg paradox "the ambiguity aversion interpretation."
The literature on the Ellsberg paradox has considered two other related interpretations of the above choices. To understand the "second-order uncertainty aversion" interpretation, consider the matrix below:
The last column describes the uncertainty regarding the ball that is chosen, while the bottom row depicts the uncertainty regarding the color of each ball. For example gg denotes the contingency in which both ball 1 and ball 2 are green, while wg describes the contingency where ball 1 is white and ball 2 is green. Assume that the decision-maker considers every possible column equally likely, every possible row equally likely, and the row and column events independent. Furthermore, assume that the uncertainty is revealed in two stages; first, the appropriate column is revealed, then the row. In this setting, a bet on R yields (for sure) a gamble that wins with probability 1 3 while a bet on W (or G) yields a lottery over gambles: with probability 1 4 the decision maker gets a gamble that wins with probability 0; with probability 1 2 , she gets a gamble that wins with probability the color of the ball that is drawn. Note that a bet on R is a bet on issue a. Hence, given our independence assumption, learning the outcome of issue b does not affect the decision-maker's belief regarding R. In contrast, the decision-maker's assessment of the probability of G conditional on ww is 0, while his assessment of G given gg is 2 3 . Hence, R is a bet on which ball gets chosen (issue a), while G entails both a bet on which ball gets chosen and on the number of green balls in the bag (issue b). Taking unions with W reverses the roles of G and R: the probability of G ∪ W does not change once issue b is resolved, while the probability of R ∪ W does. Therefore, a decision-maker who, ceteris paribus, prefers lotteries that depend only on issue a to equivalent lotteries that depend both on issue b and issue a and has the subjective prior above, must Note that both of the last two interpretations suggest the existence of two different sets of probabilities over two different collections of events (i.e., the row events and the column events above). Given the probabilities associated with the rows, by conditioning on each column, we can obtain a lottery. Then, the column probabilities yield a lottery over these lotteries. We describe decision-makers that identify each act with such a lottery over lotteries as second-order probabilistic sophisticated. The last two interpretations above suggest that the Ellsberg paradox is a consequence of greater aversion to the risk associated with the column events versus row events, or equivalently, aversion to second-order risk.
The goal of this paper is to provide a theory of second-order probabilistic sophistication (SPS), (Theorem 1), and to relate the Ellsberg paradox and various formulations of uncertainty/ambiguity aversion to each other within that theory (Theorems 2 and 5). Our main result, Theorem 2, reveals that in general, uncertainty aversion implies second-order risk aversion which implies preference for issue a. Theorems 3 and 4 provide characterization of two special classes of SPS preferences: SPS expected utility (SPS-EU) and SPS Choquet expected utility (SPS-CEU) . We show that if the agent is a SPS-expected utility maximizer or a SPS-Choquet expected utility maximizer, then second-order risk aversion, preference for issue a, and uncertainty aversion are all equivalent (Theorem 5). However, we provide examples proving that in general, uncertainty aversion is stronger than second-order risk aversion which is stronger than preference for issue a.
Related Literature
Kreps and Porteus [16] introduce a more general form of compound lotteries, which they call temporal lotteries, to study decision-makers who have a preference for when uncertainty resolves. In their theory, temporal lotteries are taken as given and their assumptions yield expected utility preferences over temporal lotteries.
We start with purely subjective uncertainty and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preference relation to be second-order probabilistically sophisticated. The derived subjective prior enables us to view every act as a mapping that associates a lottery with each resolution of one issue. Hence our model provides subjectivist foundations for the framework of the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) model. We then use the same prior to reduce each Anscombe-Aumann act to a compound lottery. That is, Theorem 3 establishes [16] model.
Savage-type foundations for a simple version of the Kreps and Porteus
By introducing the notion of a temporal lottery and hence abandoning the often implicit reduction of compound lotteries axiom, Kreps and Porteus develop a novel tool for the analysis of a variety of behavioral phenomena. One such phenomenon is ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. Given the amount and variety of work that has been done in this field, our attempt to relate our analysis to the relevant literature is bound to be incomplete.
In particular, we focus our review of the literature on models that suggest a multi-stage resolution of uncertainty or model multiple issues. A more detailed list and discussion of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion can be found in Wakker [28] .
Schmeidler [22] provides the first axiomatic model of choice geared at analyzing the Ellsberg Paradox. In that paper, he models a decision maker with preferences over Anscombe-Aumann acts who has expected utility preferences over objective (i.e., constant) acts and Choquet expected utility preferences over general acts. He introduces the notion of uncertainty aversion and relates it to the Ellsberg Paradox. Theorem 4 provides (purely) subjectivist foundations for the subclass of SPS preferences that fall in Schmeidler's model and Theorem 5 proves the equivalence of uncertainty aversion to issue preference and second order risk aversion for that subclass.
Segal [23] , [24] introduces the idea of using preferences over compound lotteries (which he calls two-stage lotteries) to analyze the Ellsberg paradox and other issues related to ambiguity. In Segal [23] , this particular model of choice over compound lotteries is assumed and Ellsberg paradox type behavior is related to the decision-maker's attitude towards second-order risk (which he calls ambiguity). Segal [24] derives a subclass of the preferences studied in Segal [23] from assumptions on the preference relation over compound lotteries and investigates the relationships among various stochastic dominance and reduction (of compound lotteries) axioms. Like Segal [23] , we relate Ellsberg paradox type behavior to a form of second-order risk aversion (Theorem 2). However, we use a different notion of second-order risk. His notion is applicable to binary acts (i.e., acts that yield the same two prizes) and is analogous to a notion of risk aversion based on comparing lotteries to their means. Our notion of second-order risk aversion is analogous to the standard notion of risk aversion based on mean preserving spreads and is applicable to all lotteries.
Our analysis of second-order risk aversion is closely related to Grant, Kajii and Polak [12] 's analysis of information aversion (or information loving). The Grant, Kajii and Polak [12] notion of an elementary linear bifurcation is equivalent to our definition of a meanpreserving spread. Hence, their notion of single-action information aversion corresponds to our second-order risk aversion. In Grant, Kajii and Polak [12] , the set of all two-stage lotteries is taken as primitive. Nevertheless, once we establish second-order probabilistic sophistication, we can easily compare their results to ours. In particular, parts of their Proposition 1 are equivalent to parts of our Theorem 2.
Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [15] also have a model that describes the resolution of uncertainty in two stages. Some interpretational and modeling differences notwithstanding, their utility function is formally analogous to the one describing SPS-EU preferences (Theorem 3). The most significant interpretational difference between our model and that of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji is that they permit both the possibility that the first stage of uncertainty might be identified with a particular observable and the possibility that the first stage uncertainty is simply a part of the individual's preferences that can be pinned-down only with "cognitive data or thought experiments."
The notion of ambiguity aversion used in Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [15] is formally similar to our concept of second-order risk aversion. Their definition entails comparing arbitrary second-order lotteries to appropriate second-order riskless lotteries, i.e., it is analogous to a definition of risk aversion based on comparing lotteries to their means. Within their expected utility framework (and hence the setting of Theorem 3), risk aversion defined as not preferring the distribution to its mean is equivalent to risk aversion defined as preferring the distribution to a mean preserving spread.
Seo [25] considers preferences over the following choice objects: a lottery, P , is a probability distribution over acts f which map states to probability distributions, p, over prizes
x. Hence, this is Anscombe-Aumann's original framework. Seo characterizes preferences that can be represented by an expected utility function, U , such that its von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, u, is analogous to the SPS-EU utility function of our Theorem 3.
The richer setting permits Seo to derive this representation from an ingenious dominance assumption.
Tversky and Fox [26] introduce the notion of source (i.e., issue preference) and provide evidence showing that, ceteris paribus, basketball fans prefer gambles on the outcomes of basketball games to objective gambles. Abdellaoui, Baillon, and Wakker [1] expand on the Tversky and Fox approach and provide more evidence of issue preference. They show that decision makers prefer betting on the temperature in their own city (Paris) to betting on the temperature in foreign cities.
Nau [19] provides a theoretical model with two issues. Nau assumes a finite state space Ω = Ω a × Ω b , provides axioms that ensure the existence of a representation that is additively separable when restricted to lotteries that depend only on issue a or only on issue b but permit state-dependent preferences. He also derives the state-independent representation by imposing Wakker [27] 's trade-off consistency axiom. Unlike Nau, we do not allow for state dependent preferences. However, we permit general, nonseparable (i.e., nonexpected utility) preferences and probabilistic sophistication.
Second-Order Probabilistic Sophistication
Let Z be the set of prizes and Ω := Ω a × Ω b be the set of all states. We refer to a, b as issues. Let A be the algebra of all subsets of Ω a and B be the algebra of all subsets of Ω b . Let E a denote the algebra of all sets of the form A × Ω b for some A ∈ A, E b denote the algebra of all sets of the form Ω a × B for some B ∈ B, and E denote the algebra of all sets that can be expressed as finite unions of sets of the form
Let F denote the set of all (Savage) acts; that is, F is the set of E-measurable functions from Ω to Z. A binary relation on F characterizes an individual. Our first assumption is that this binary relation is a preference relation.
Axiom 1: (Preference Relation) is complete and transitive.
We use ∼ to denote the indifference relation associated with and use f g to denote f g and not g f . We identify each z ∈ Z with the corresponding constant act.
Our second assumption ensures that the individual is not indifferent among all constant acts.
Axiom 2: (Nondegeneracy) There exists x, y ∈ Z such that x y.
Let E c denote the complement of E in Ω. For any set E ∈ E, we say that the acts f and g agree on E if f (s) = g(s) for all s ∈ E. We write f = g on E to denote the fact that
the event E is non-null. 
Most models that study acts (i.e., the Savage setting) impose the assumptions above. 1
These models differ in their comparative probability axiom and their separability axioms.
Note that for any f ∈ F, there exists a partition A 1 , . . . , A n of A and a partition
. . , n and j = 1, . . . , m. Hence, we can identify each f ∈ F with some n + 1 by m + 1 matrix. That is:
Let F a and F b denote the set of E a -measurable and E b -measurable acts respectively.
For f ∈ F a and g ∈ F b we write
Axiom 5a: (a−Strong Comparative Probability) If x y and x y then
Axiom 5a is the Machina-Schmeidler strong comparative probability axiom imposed on E a -measurable acts. Consider prizes x, y such that x y and an act f that yields x on
If the decision-maker prefers f to the act that yields y
The assumption asserts that prizes don't affect probabilities. That is, if we conclude that the decision-maker A 1 × Ω b strictly more likely than A 2 × Ω b using some act f , we should not be able to conclude the opposite using some other act f . Our main new assumption is the axiom below:
Henceforth, we refer to Axioms 5a and 5b together as Axiom 5. Axiom 5b has three important implications. First, it implies the Machina-Schmeidler strong comparative probability axiom on E b . To see this, assume that all columns in the above statement of Axiom 5b are constants. That is, x 1 = x 2 = . . . = x n , y 1 = y 2 = . . . = y n , z 13 = z 23 = . . . = z n3 , etc. Then, we obtain a symmetric version of Axiom 5a. This ensures that the agent is probabilistically sophisticated over E b -measurable acts. It follows from this observation that Axiom 5b is stronger than the symmetric counterpart of 5a. To see the other two implications, consider the example below: suppose
suggesting that both μ a (A 1 ) and μ a (A 2 ) are close to 1 2 . Then, Axiom 5b implies
But, the preferences for f over g andf overĝ rely on the fact that the rows of f and g are (almost) equally likely and f g and f g require that conditional on each column, these rows remain (almost) equally likely. Hence, Axiom 5b implies that equally likely issue a (i.e., row) events remain equally likely after conditioning on any issue b (column) event. Thus, the second implication of the axiom is that it renders the issues statistically independent.
To understand the final implication of Axiom 5b, suppose that B 1 is more likely than B 2 . Then, the first row of g is worse than the first row of f but the second row of g is better than the second row of f . But, assuming μ b (B 3 ) is not very small, this means that the rows of f yield closer payoffs than those of g , while the rows of g yield closer payoffs
than those of f . Hence, f has less (second-order) issue a risk than g , while f has more second order issue a risk than g . By demanding that f g implies f g , Axiom 5b
precludes aversion to such risk. It is this feature of Axiom 5b that permits the translation of acts into compound lotteries where second-order risk is only associated with issue b.
Let Δ(Z ) = {p : Z → [0, 1] : p −1 ((0, 1]) is finite and z p(z) = 1} be the set of all simple lotteries on some set Z . Let δ z denote the degenerate lottery that yields z with probability 1.
We use p, p and p to denote generic elements of P := Δ(Z) and π, π , π to denote generic elements of Δ(P ). Hence, P is the set of simple lotteries on Z and Δ(P ) is the set of simple lotteries on P . We call Δ(P ) the set of compound lotteries.
Let μ a and μ b denote the marginals of the probability measure μ on the two issues, i.e. μ a (A) = μ(A × Ω b ) and
Since the underlying μ is clear we suppress the dependence on μ in the definitions below.
and let F * be the set of all simple functions from Ω b to P .
Next, we describe how to associate a compound lottery with each Anscombe-Aumann act. Note that F * is a mixture space (with the usual) Anscombe-Aumann mixture operation which defines αf * + (1 − α)g * as the act that yields in state s, the von Neumann-
Definition (π f ): Let μ be a probability on E and let E a , E b be μ−independent. For f ∈ F, define the compound lottery π f as follows:
The three mappings described above are all onto when
We endow P with the supremum metric and Δ(P ) with the Prohorov metric. 3 That is, let d ∞ (p, p ) = sup z∈Z |p(z) − p (z)| for p, p ∈ P and for any finite set T ⊂ P , let
Then, let d Δ (π, π ) be the infimum of that satisfy π(T ) ≤ π (T ) + and π (T ) ≤ π(T ) + for all finite T ⊂ P . 4 For any compound lottery π, define supp Z π to be the union of all z in the support of p over p in the support of π. That is, supp Z π = p∈supp π supp p.
The Prohorov metric is usually defined more generally on the set of all probability measures on the Borel sets of a metric space. Here, we are considering the subspace, Δ(P ), of that space. 4 In the standard definition of the Prohorov metric (see for example Billingsley [4] ), the infimum is taken over such that the above inequalities are satisfied for all Borel measurable T ⊂ P . Note that the two definitions coincide for simple probability measures. 5 Since we require ∞ n=1 supp Z π n to be finite, our results would not change if we endow P with any metric topology such that the relative topology of Δ(Z ) in P coincides with the Euclidean topology of Δ(Z ), for all finite Z ⊂ Z. For example, our results go not change if we replace the supremum metric with the metric
It is well known that the Prohorov metric topology and the topology of weak convergence are equivalent when P is a separable metric space. Therefore, for finite Z, our weak continuity indeed becomes continuity in the topology of weak convergence.
Machina and Schmeidler call a decision-maker probabilistically sophisticated if he has a subjective prior over the state-space, considers all acts that yield the same lottery equivalent and satisfies stochastic dominance. We refer to preferences satisfying Axioms 1 − 5 as second-order probabilistically sophisticated (SPS) preferences. Theorem 1 shows decision-makers with SPS preferences are indifferent between f and g whenever f and g yield the same compound lottery; that is, f ∼ g whenever π f = π g . But, they need not be indifferent between f and g if p f = p g because these decision-makers also care about second-order risk. 
Familiar arguments ensure that the μ of Theorem 1 is unique and W is unique up to a continuous monotone transformation. The details of the proof of Theorem 1, which rely on Theorem 2 of Machina and Schmeidler [17] , are in the appendix. Here, we give a sketch.
The main idea is to apply Machina and Schmeidler's proof of probabilistic sophistication twice, first to F a , then to F * . Let Ω be an arbitrary state space, Z be any set of prizes and let F be the set of all simple functions from Ω to Z . Theorem 2 of Machina and Schmeidler [17] establishes that if a binary relation over F satisfies Axiom 1 − 3 and continuity (i.e., replace Ω a with Ω in Axiom 4a) and strong comparative probability (i.e., let the A i 's in Axiom 5a denote arbitrary subset of Ω ) then is probabilistically sophisticated. Applying this theorem to F a yields a probability measure μ a and a stochastic dominance satisfying functionw : In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that * is well-defined; that is, f * = g * implies f ∼ g. Applying Machina and Schmeidler's Theorem 2 again, we obtain a probability μ b
on Ω b and a stochastic dominance satisfying function W :
To complete to proof we show that W is weakly continuous.
To see how we can derive a subjective version of the Anscombe-Aumann model for our framework and use it to relate Axiom 5b to existing comparative probability and replacement axioms, we identify each f ∈ F a with a function f a : Ω a → Z by setting
as follows:
We let f a denote χ(f ).
Then, by identifying each f ∈ F with a function from Ω b to F 0 a , we can interpret Axiom 5b as Machina-Schmeidler's strong comparative probability axiom applied to acts on Ω b with prizes in F 0 a . To clarify this symmetry between Axioms 5a and 5b, we re-state Axiom 5b as follows:
Hence, we impose the Machina-Schmeidler comparative probability assumption on E a -measurable acts with prizes Z and on E b -measurable acts with prizes in F 0 a but never on arbitrary E-measurable acts. Therefore, in one sense, Axiom 5 is stronger than the corresponding assumption in Machina and Schmeidler [17] , it is applied to a richer set of prizes. On the other hand, there is a sense in which Axiom 5 is weaker; it is applied to a smaller set of acts. 6
The Machina-Schmeidler comparative probability assumption applied to all acts in F would not yield a μ that is a product measure while our assumptions do not ensure that acts can be reduced to lotteries; only that they can be reduced to compound lotteries. More specifically, our assumptions enable us to identify Savage acts on Ω a × Ω b with Anscombe-Aumann acts on Ω b . The implied preferences on these Anscombe-Aumann acts are weaker than the preferences considered in Machina and Schmeidler [18] and Grant and Polak [13] ).
These two papers define preferences over Anscombe-Aumann acts and impose assumptions (a replacement axiom in the former paper and two axioms, betting neutrality and twooutcome independence in the latter) that our model does not satisfy. By circumventing the calibration of subjective probabilities with objective probabilities, or equivalently, the b−probabilities with a−probabilities that the additional Machina and Schmeidler [18] or Grant and Polak [13] assumptions enable, our model permits issue preference and related violations of probabilistic sophistication such as the Ellsberg paradox.
An alternative approach to the one we have taken here would be to impose more structure on Z, for example, assume that it is an interval of real numbers, and enough continuity to ensure that conditional certainty equivalents are well defined. Then, we could strengthen Axiom 3 to cover a richer set of prizes such as the f a 's in the second version of Axiom 5b. Given this stronger version of monotonicity, we could weaken Axiom 5b to apply only to acts in F b (i.e., make it just like 5a) and still obtain the representation of Theorem 1.
Second-Order Risk Aversion and the Ellsberg Paradox
In this section, we provide measures of second-order risk, relate second-order risk aversion to issue preference and the Ellsberg paradox. By Axiom 2, there are prizes x, y ∈ Z such that x y. Let x = 1 and y = 0. Consider the following acts
Note that if μ is any measure on E that renders the issues independent and μ(A) = μ(B) = 1 2 , then π g = π h . To see this note that both π g and π h assign probability 1 to the lottery p that yields 1 with probability 1 2 and 0 with probability 1 2 . If is an SPS decision-maker, then π g = π h implies g ∼ h. Note also that p f = p g = p h = p. Hence, if the decision-maker were probabilistically sophisticated, he would be indifferent among all three acts. However, an SPS decision-maker may distinguish between acts that yield different second-order distributions. Observe that
A decision-maker facing the bet f will know the outcome of his bet whenever he learns the resolution of issue b while a decision-maker holding the bet g or h will learn nothing when he learns the resolution of issue b. That is, a decision-maker confronting f faces significant second-order risk (with respect to issue b) while a decision-maker facing g or h faces no second-order risk.
Note however that by identifying issue a with the number of green balls and issue b with the number of the ball that gets chosen, we could have interpreted the Ellsberg paradox as a consequence of second-order risk loving behavior. Which of the two possible ways of assigning issues is the right one? More generally, how can we distinguish issue a type uncertainty from issue b type uncertainty? In our approach, the choice of issue b (i.e., the source of second-order risk), like the assignment of probabilities, is a subjective matter.
Regardless of which issue is issue a and which issue is issue b, the compound lottery associated with act h is δ 1 2 δ 1 + 1 2 δ 0 . Now, to verify which issue is the one associated with second-order risk, i.e., issue b, we need to check if agent is indifferent between g and h or f and h. The former, means that the column events are issue b events, while the latter implies that the row events are issue b events.
This notion of second-order risk is analogous to the standard notion of risk. To see the similarity between the two concepts recall that when Z is an interval of real numbers, both Z and Δ(Z) are mixture spaces. Suppose there are two lotteries p, p ∈ Δ(Z) such
to be a mean-preserving spread of p . A decision-maker who has preferences over lotteries is risk averse if he prefers p to p whenever p is a mean preserving spread of p . Hence, a risk averse decision-maker prefers it when a mixture in the space Δ(Z) is replaced by mixture in the space Z. Since Δ(P ) and P are also mixture spaces, we can use the same idea to define second-order risk aversion:
Definition:
The compound lottery π is a mean preserving spread of π if there are α, β ∈ [0, 1], p, q ∈ P , and π ∈ Δ(P ) such that
We say that is second-order risk averse if f f whenever π f is a mean preserving spread of π f .
Theorem 2:
Let be an SPS preference. Then, (iii)
The equivalence of (i) and (ii) is the most difficult argument in the proof of Theorem 2 and is closely related to Proposition 1(i) in Grant, Kajii and Polak [12] . Condition applies only to f and g that yield the same compound lottery. By Theorem 1, such acts are indifferent. Hence, (iii) implies (ii). Condition (iv) states that if f is a bet on issue a, h is a bet on issue b and g is any act that has the same subjective probability distribution as f and h, then, the decision-maker will prefer f to g and g to h. We call this condition issue preference. It is not difficult to verify that if f ∈ F a , g ∈ F and h ∈ F b such that p f = p g = p h , then there is a finite sequence of compound lotteries π 1 , . . . , π n such that π 1 = π f , π j = π g for some j, π n = π h , and π i+1 is a mean preserving spread of π i for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Hence, condition (ii) implies condition (iv).
In the appendix, after the proof Theorem 2, we provide counter-examples to (iv) implies (ii) and to (ii) implies (iii). Hence, a result stronger than Theorem 2 cannot be proved. To see why (iv) does not imply (ii), note that (iv) provides no criterion for comparing f and g when neither is an element of F a ∪ F b even if π g is a mean-preserving
spread of π f . To get intuition as to why (ii) does not imply (iii), consider the simplest case with only two prizes and two equally likely states in Ω b . Then, each act f * can be identified with a point in [0, 1] 2 . In this setting, (iii) is the statement that the implied preferences on
for all (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 .
In the following section, we show that conditions (i)-(iv) are equivalent for SPS preferences that are EU within each issue or satisfy comonotonic independence in the sense of Schmeidler [22] .
Second-Order Risk with Expected Utility Preferences
Simpler and stronger characterization of second-order risk aversion are feasible for SPS preferences satisfying certain expected utility properties. Axiom 6a below is Savage's sure thing principle applied to acts in F a . In contrast, Axiom 6b is Savage's sure thing principle applied to all acts conditional on events in E b . We refer to Axioms 6a, b together as Axiom 6. Theorem 3 below establishes that imposing Axiom 6 on SPS preferences yields a version of the model introduced by Kreps and Porteus [16] . In this case, the agent is an expected utility maximizer with respect to both issue a and b lotteries but may not be indifferent between an issue a lottery and an equivalent issue b lottery. We refer to this type of preferences as SPS-EU preferences. Parts (a) and (b) of the following axiom impose Savage's sure thing principle on issue a and issue b dependent acts. Note that both parts of the axiom together are weaker than Savage's sure thing principle since neither part permits conditioning on events E / ∈ E a ∪ E b .
impliesf g if and only iff g Nau [19] deals with a finite state space that also has a product structure; that is, he too has two issues. His Axiom 2 is analogous to Axiom 6(b) above and his Axiom (3) 
for some continuous and strictly increasing v : IR → IR and nonconstant u : Z → IR.
We refer to preferences that satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 3 as SPS expected utility (SPS-EU) preferences. We call the corresponding (v, u, μ) a representation of . 7 Compound lotteries are simplified versions of Kreps-Porteus temporal lotteries. The latter allow for interim consumption and more importantly, multiple periods. 8 Machina and Schmeidler's comparative probability axiom, which is analogous to our Axiom 5 is stronger than Savage's comparative probability axiom. In the presence of the sure thing principle, Savage's axiom is equivalent to the Machina-Schmeidler axiom. Therefore, in Theorem 3, we can replace Axiom 5 with suitable analogues of Savage's comparative probability axiom.
It is easy to verify that a SPS-EU preference (v, u, μ) is second-order risk averse if and only if v is concave. Hence, second-order risk aversion of a SPS-EU preferences is formally equivalent to preference for late resolution of uncertainty as formulated by Kreps and Porteus [16] . 
Then, a preference relation * on F * is a Choquet expected utility preference if there exists a capacity ν and an expected utility function U : P → IR such that the function W * defined below represents .
Schmeidler's axiomatization of Choquet expected utility relies on the comonotonic independence axiom. Gilboa [10] provides a characterization of Choquet expected utility preferences in the Savage setting. The axiom below is a version of the comonotonic independence axiom that yields second-order probabilistically sophisticated Choquet expected utility preferences.
Definition: Let f and g be the two acts below: 
The axiom below is the comonotonic sure thing principle for SPS preferences. It imposes the sure thing principle on all comonotonic acts conditional on E a events. 
Our final result provides a stronger characterization of second-order risk aversion for SPS-EU and SPS-CEU preferences. The theorem establishes that for such preferences, second-order risk aversion is equivalent to issue preference and to Schmeidler's notion of uncertainty aversion provided we identify Schmeidler's objective lotteries with issue a. It follows that all of the characterizations of uncertainty aversion provided by Schmeidler are also characterizations second-order risk aversion. 9
Theorem 5: Let be a SPS-EU preference or a SPS-CEU preference. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
Note that by Theorem 2, to prove Theorem 5, it is enough to show that (iv) implies (iii). Consider the following weakening of condition (iv):
(
For SPS-EU preferences, (v) is equivalent to (iv). This fact is formally related to the observation that for expected utility preferences, defining risk aversion by comparing lotteries to their means versus by comparing lotteries to their mean preserving spreads leads to identical formulations of risk aversion and comparative risk aversion. Furthermore, it is known that (v) implies (i) (see for example Grant, Kajii and Polak [12] ). Klibanoff,
Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) define ambiguity aversion as (v) applied to binary acts. For
SPS-EU preferences, this ensures that the condition holds for all acts. 10 For SPS-CEU preferences, (v) is not equivalent to (iv): while (iv) is equivalent to the convexity of γ, (v)
is equivalent to γ(t) ≤ t for all t ∈ [0, 1]. 11
Conclusion
As in the first interpretation outlined in the introduction, the Ellsberg paradox is often intuitively identified with aversion to ambiguity. Recently, a number of authors have formalized this intuition by providing definitions of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
The approach taken by these authors is roughly the following: first, a set of unambiguous acts is defined. Then, an ambiguity neutral agent is defined. Finally, agent 1 is defined to be ambiguity averse if there is an ambiguity neutral agent 2 such that for any act g and any unambiguous act f , f 2 g implies f 1 g. The notion of ambiguity/ambiguity aversion formalized in Epstein [6] and Epstein and Zhang [7] differs from the one in Ghirardato and Marinacci [9] with respect to the underlying notion of ambiguity neutrality.
Epstein [6] identifies being ambiguity neutral with probabilistic sophistication while Ghirardato and Marinacci [9] define ambiguity neutrality as expected utility maximization.
Ghirardato and Marinacci [9] seek a very broad notion that permits them to relate any departure from the expected utility model as either ambiguity aversion or ambiguity loving, while the Epstein/Epstein and Zhang formulation is tailored to the analysis of the Ellsberg paradox.
In contrast, both in Nau [19] and in our model, the emphasis is on the agent having different preferences on uncertain acts that depend on separate issues. Nau defines the agent's preferred issue as the unambiguous one. Like Ghirardato and Marinacci, Nau uses his model to provide a unified framework analyzing state dependent preferences, the Ellsberg paradox and the Allais' paradox. Like Epstein [6] and Epstein and Zhang [7] , we have attempted to identify our central concept (issue preference or equivalently, secondorder risk aversion) exclusively with the Ellsberg paradox. 11 We are grateful to the associate editor for this last observation.
Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1
We start by proving a useful result about the Prohorov metric on Δ(P ).
Lemma 0: Suppose that μ b is a nonatomic probability measure on E b . Let π, π ∈ Δ(P ), f * ∈ F * , and π = π f * . Then, d Δ (π, π ) is the infimum of > 0 for which there exist g * ∈ F * such that π g * = π and
Proof: It is easy to see that if satisfies Equation (1) for some g * ∈ F * with π g * = π , then d Δ (π, π ) ≤ . To see the other direction, suppose that d Δ (π, π ) < . Let To see the necessity of the axioms, suppose that the μ and W that the theorem specifies exist. Then, Axioms 1, 3, and 5 are obviously satisfied. Note that if all constant acts were indifferent, then the fact that w and W satisfy stochastic dominance would imply that both w, W are constant functions, a contradiction. Hence, Axiom 2 is also satisfied.
To see that Axiom 4 is satisfied, consider any f, g such that W (π f ) > W (π g ) and let z be any element of Z. Without loss of generality that we can express f as:
(This is possible since μ a is nonatomic.)
Let f E be the act obtained from f by replacing the outcome of f with z at s ∈ E ∈ E. 
Proof: Let B 1 be nonnull. We prove the lemma in two steps. In Step 1, we show that strict preference on the left hand side implies strict preference on the right hand side.
In the second step we show that indifference ∼ on the left hand side implies indifference ∼ on the right hand side.
Step 1: First assume that
By Axiom 2, there exist x, y ∈ Z be such that x y. By Axiom 3,
Applying to the partition
Step 2: Assume that ⎛ ⎝
Suppose that the acts 
Let z be a -worst and z a -best outcome in {x i : i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {y i : i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {z ij : i = 1, . . . , n, j = 2, . . . , m}. Then, by Axioms 2 and 3, we can find z * such that
Suppose we have a z * as in above (The other case can be covered by a symmetric argument). By the representation obtained for | F a , there exists i * ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that z * y i * and μ a (A i * ) > 0. Without loss of generality let i * = 1.
By Axiom 4a, there is a partition C 1 , . . . , C k of Ω a such that for any i = 1, . . . , k:
Since μ a (A 1 ) > 0, there is i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that μ a (C i ∩ A 1 ) > 0. Since z * z, by iterated application of Axiom 3, we have
Since μ a (C i ∩ A 1 ) > 0 and z * y 1 , by the representation for | F a , we have
But then Step 1 implies that
a contradiction to ( * ).
Lemma 1 and the representation obtained for | F a permit us associate with a preference * on Anscombe-Aumann acts F * as follows. For any f ∈ F let f * * g * ⇔ f g. We next note that * is well defined as a preference on F * .
Lemma 2:
(i) For any h ∈ F * there is f ∈ F such that h = f * .
(ii) If f * = g * then f ∼ g.
Proof: Part (i) follows from nonatomicity of μ a , part (ii) follows from iterated application of Lemma 1.
By construction δ p * δ q ⇔w(p) >w(q). The preference relation * inherits the nondegeneracy axiom from . Note that a set B ∈ B is null with respect to * if and only if it is null with respect to . Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that * satisfies Statewise Monotonicity. By Axiom 3 and Axiom 4, * satisfies continuity on Ω b . Finally, by Axiom 5b, * also satisfies Strong Comparative Probability. Therefore, we can apply Theorem 2 of Machina and Schmeidler [17] once again, in order to obtain a nonatomic probability measure μ b on (Ω b , B) and a function W: Δ (P ) → IR such that (i) W is mixture continuous and monotonic with respect to first order stochastic dominance and (ii) W (π * f * ) ≥ W (π * g * ) iff f * g * for all f, g ∈ F where π * h * ∈ Δ(P ) is defined by π * h * (p) = μ b (h * −1 (p))). Note also that the proof in Machina and Schmeidler [17] yields W such that {W (π * ) : π * ∈ Δ(P )} is convex.
Since π f = π * f * for any f ∈ F, we have that
showing that w andw are ordinally equivalent. In particular, w is also monotonic with respect to first order stochastic dominance. We conclude the proof by showing that W is weakly continuous.
Lemma 3: W is weakly continuous.
Proof: Assume that the sequence π t converges to π and ∞ t=1 supp Z π t is finite. Suppose that W (π) > liminf W (π t ). Note that Theorem 2 in Machina and Schmeidler [17] ensures that W has a convex range. Therefore, there exists π such that W (π) > W(π ) > liminf W (π t ). By nonatomicity of μ, there exists f such that π f = π . We can assume without loss of generality that f can be expressed as:
x 1j x ij , for i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m. (If f does not have the above form, using nonatomicity of μ a we can findf ∈ F of the desired form such that
Axiom 4a, there is a partition C 1 , . . . , C I of Ω a such that for any i = 1, . . . , I:
where the weak preference above follows from iterated application of Axiom 3.
Suppose without loss of generality that:
(If g does not satisfy (iii) and (iv), we can reorder the columns by adjoining the null B j 's to a nonnull one and constructḡ satisfying (iii) and (iv) such that the equalityḡ * = g * holds μ b -almost surely.)
Since g f , by Axiom 4b, there is a partition D 1 , . . . , D J of Ω b such that for any j = 1, . . . , J:
where again the weak preference above follows from iterated application of Axiom 3. Let = min{μ a (C)/n, μ b (D)/m} > 0 and let t be such that d Δ (π, π t ) < . By Lemma
. . , n and j = 1, . . . , m.
Then, by (iv) and iterated application of monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance of W , we obtain:
Similarly, by (ii) and iterated application of monotonicity with respect to stochastic dominance of w and W , we obtain:
Finally, by iterated application of Axiom 3, we have thatf t g t . Therefore, f t ∼f t g t h t h f , implying that W (π t ) > W(π ) for all t ≥ N , a contradiction to W (π ) > liminf W (π t ). Therefore, W (π) ≤ liminf W (π t ). A symmetric argument shows that limsup W (π t ) ≤ W (π), implying that W (π) = lim W (π t ).
Proof of Theorem 2
Part (iii) ⇒ (ii) follows from π f = π g ⇒ f ∼ g for SPS preferences. To see the implication (i) ⇒ (iv), it is enough to note that f ∈ F a , g ∈ F, and h ∈ F b induce the same lottery (i.e., p f = p g = p h ) then, there exists π 1 , . . . , π m and 1 ≤ k ≤ m such that π j+1 is a mean preserving spread of π j for all j = 1, . . . , m − 1, π 1 = π f , π k = π g and π m = π h . To conclude the proof we will show the equivalence of (i) and (ii).
(i) ⇒ (ii): Assume that is second order risk averse. Let f, g, h ∈ F be such that h * = αf * + (1 − α)g * and π f = π g . Then
Therefore there exists π 1 , . . . , π m such that π 1 = π h , π m = π and π j+1 is a mean preserving spread of π j for j = 1, . . . , m − 1. Hence, (i) implies W (π h ) ≥ W (π). We can rewrite π as
Since π f = π and W represents , we have h f .
(ii) ⇒ (i): Assume that the SRS preference satisfies condition (ii). We will show that f g whenever π g is a mean preserving spread of π f . Let π g be a mean preserving spread of π f , then there are α, β ∈ [0, 1], p, q ∈ P and π ∈ Δ(P ) such that 
where i is the number of 0's in the k-digit binary expansion of l. (For example, if k = 5 and l = 9 then the 5-digit binary expansion of 9 is 01001 so i = 3.) By nonatomicity of μ a , we can find a sequence of acts g k ∈ F such that:
By definition g * 1 = g * , implying that g 1 ∼ g. By nonatomicity of μ b , there exist acts h n m for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . and m = 1, 2, . . . such that:
i.e., (h n m ) * is the average of the mth 2 n consecutive Anscombe-Aumann acts in the sequence g * k .
Note that on B 2 n l , (h n 1 ) * gives i 2 n p + 2 n −i 2 n q and on B m2 n l , (h n m ) * gives i 2 n p + 2 n −i 2 n q where i is the number of 0's in the last 2 n digits in the m2 n -digit binary expansion of l.
Therefore, we can write π h n 1 as:
It is easy to verify that π h n m = π h n 1 and therefore h n m ∼ h n 1 for all m ≥ 1. Since (h n+1 m ) * = 1 2 (h n 2m−1 ) * + 1 2 (h n 2m ) * and π h n 2m−1 = π h n 2m , by condition (ii), h n+1 m h n 2m−1 . Therefore, by transitivity, h n 1 h 0 1 for any n ≥ 0. Since (h 0 1 ) * = g * 1 we have h 0 1 ∼ g 1 , thus h n 1 h 0 1 ∼ g 1 ∼ g implying that h n 1 g for any n ≥ 0.
Next, we show that π h n 1 converges to π f . Let > 0 be given. Define the probability measure for any β ∈ (β − , β + ). By the Weak Law of Large Numbers 12 (applied to T k on the probability space (Ω b , B, μ * )), the average of i.i.d. Bernouilli random variables with mean β converges in probability to β. Therefore, there is N such that for any n ≥ N :
Then, for any n ≥ N ,
supp Z π h n 1 = supp Z π f is finite and W (π h n 1 ) ≥ W (π g ), weak continuity of W implies that W (π f ) ≥ W (π g ). Therefore, is second order risk averse.
Below, we provide counter-examples to (iv) implies (i) and (i) implies (iii). For both
counter-examples assume that Z = {0, 1}. Hence, P can be identified with the unit interval where p ∈ P denotes the probability of getting 1. Also, each π can be identified with a simple probability distribution on the unit interval. Let μ a be any nonatomic probability measure on the set of all subsets of some Ω a . Similarly, let μ b be any nonatomic probability measure on the set of all subsets of some Ω b .
We first define a weakly continuous utility function W on Δ(P ). Since each f ∈ F can be identified with a unique π f , this utility function induces a preference W on F.
Define the function m : Δ(P ) → [0, 1] as follows:
Hence, m(π) is the mean of π. For any lottery π define η π , the mean error of π, as follows:
Hence, m(η π ) is the mean absolute error of π. Let ψ(α) = log(1+α) 4 . Define,
The weak continuity of W is easy to verify. It is straightforward to check that for any y > x, a small increase in π(y) at the expense of π(x) cannot increase m(η π ) at a rate greater than 2(y − x). To see this, note that such an increase will have two kinds of effects.
First, it could change m(π) and second it will increase the weight on the term |y − m(π)| at the expense of the weight on the term |x − m(π)|. Each of these effects can increase m(η π ) at a rate no more than y − x and hence ψ(m(η π )) cannot increase at a rate greater than (y − x)/2. On the other hand, such an increase in π(y) increases m(π) at a rate y − x and therefore, the overall effect is an increase in W (π). It follows that W satisfies stochastic dominance. Since w(x) = W (δ x ) = x, we conclude that w satisfies stochastic dominance as well. We claim that W satisfies (i) but not (iii). To verify (i), note that W is risk averse since mean-preserving spreads leave m(π) unchanged and (weakly) increase m(η π ).
To see that W does not satisfy (iii), let π = .5δ 1 + .5δ 0 and set w = W (π) < .5.
Choose f, g such that π f = δ w and π g = π. Then, straightforward calculations yield π .5f * +.5g * = .5δ .5w+.5 + .5δ .5w and m(η π .5f * +.5g * ) = .5m(η π ) + .5m(η δ w ) = .5m(η π ). Hence, the strict concavity of ψ ensures that W (π .5f * +.5g * ) < .5W (π) + .5W (δ w ) = w proving that W does not satisfy (iii).
For the second counter-example, let V be the nonexpected utility functional on Δ(P ) defined as follows:
where π = απ 1 + (1 − α)π 2 , π 1 (x) > 0 implies x ≥ V (π) and π 2 (x) > 0 implies x ≤ V (π).
The preference represented by this V belongs to the class introduced in Gul [14] . 13 In that paper, it is shown that the function V is well-defined; that is, a real number V (π) satisfying ( * ) always exists and that this number is the same for any α, π 1 , π 2 satisfying the properties above. Define W : Δ(P ) → IR as follows:
The function V described in ( * ) is neither risk averse nor risk loving and since the rest of W is linear, this means that W is neither risk averse nor risk loving. This feature 13 In particular, this preferences is a disappointment averse preference with linear u and β = 1.
of W permits the preferences that W represents to fail (ii) but still satisfy (iv). Again, it can be verified that W is weakly continuous and that for y > x a small increase in π(y) at the expense of π(x) has two effects. First, it can increase V (η π ) by changing m(π) and increasing each |z − m(π)|. This effect is at most y − x. The second effect is the one associated with increasing the weight of |y − m(π)| and decreasing the weight of |x − m(π)| (while keeping m(π) fixed) in the definition of V . Note that the function V is piecewise differentiable. Considering each case separately (|y−m(π)| > |x−m(π)| ≥ V (η π );
this derivative of V is at most 2(y − x). Hence, the total effect of a small increase in π(y) together with the same small decrease in π(x) is no greater than 3(y − x) and therefore the total effect of this change on W is at least (y − x)/4 > 0, proving that W and the function w defined by w(p) := W (δ p ) both satisfy stochastic dominance. We claim that
On the other hand, for V (η π g ), ( * ) yields 1] . Somewhat tedious but straightforward calculations reveal that setting y = 1, x = 0, and α = γ maximizes the right-hand side of the display equation above among all α, x, y satisfying these constraints.
A symmetric argument shows that V (η π h ) ≥ V (η π g ) for the γ ≥ 1 2 case as well. To show that W does not satisfy (ii), we construct π and π such that π is a meanpreserving spread of π and V (η π ) > V (η π ). For example π = .4δ 5/6 + .6δ 0 and π = .2δ 1 + .2δ 2/3 + .6δ 0 and hence V (η π ) = 3/8, V (η π ) = 10/27 satisfy the desired inequality.
Hence, the preference that W represents fails (i) and by Theorem 2, it fails (ii).
Proof of Theorem 3
Verifying that if the desired representation exists, then Axioms 1-6 are satisfied is straightforward and omitted. Suppose Axioms 1-6 are satisfied and let W be the representation of guaranteed by Theorem 1. Let μ = μ a × μ b be the associated probability measure. Define * on F * as follows f * * g * if and only if W (π f ) ≥ W (π g ). Since μ b and μ a are nonatomic, * is well-defined. It follows from Axiom 6b and Savage's Theorem that * has an expected utility representation W * such that W * (f * ) = p U * (p)μ(f * −1 (p)).
By Axiom 6a, the preference on F a defined by f g if and only if U * (p f ) ≥ U * (p g ) satisfies all of the Savage axioms and therefore there exists an expected utility function
Since U * and U represent the same preference, the restriction of to F a , there exist a strictly increasing
W (π f ) ≥ W (π g ). Since U is an expected utility function, U (P ) is an interval. Hence, if v is continuous it can easily be extended to a continuous, strictly increasing function on IR. Therefore, to conclude the proof, we need only to show that v is continuous. Since, v is strictly increasing, there are only two possible types of discontinuities it can have:
There exists t = U (p) and ε > 0 such that either v(t) ≥ v(t ) + ε for all t < t, t ∈ U (P )
or v(t ) ≥ v(t) + ε for all t > t, t ∈ U (P ). Suppose, the former holds for some t (the argument for the other case is symmetric and omitted).
x minimize U (δ z ) among z in the support of p . There exists A ∈ A with μ a (A) > 0 such that f gives a prize strictly better than x on A. Then, for any A ⊂ A such that μ a (A ) > 0
So, g f , contradicting Axiom 4a.
Proof of Theorem 4
Two acts f * , g * ∈ F * such that By the theorem on page 578 of Schmeidler [22] , if a preference relation * on F * satisfies vNM continuity, weak stochastic dominance (i.e., f
implies f * * g * ), weak nondegeneracy (i.e., there exists f * , g * such that f * * g * ) and
comonotonic independence, then it is has a Choquet expected utility representation.
The proof that the existence of the W in the statement of Theorem 3 implies that * is a CEU preference is standard. The proof that satisfies Axiom 6c whenever * is a CEU preference is straightforward and omitted. We conclude by proving that the axioms guarantee the desired representation.
Assume that satisfies Axioms 1 − 5 and 6c. By Theorem 1, there exists a preference * on F * such that f g iff f * * g * and a nonconstant, weakly continuous, stochastic monotonicity satisfying W such that W (π f ) ≥ W (π g ) iff f * * g * for all f, g ∈ F. Since W is nonconstant, * satisfies weak nondegeneracy and since W is satisfies stochastic dominance, * satisfies weak stochastic dominance. Also, it follows from the weak continuity of W that * satisfies vNM continuity. We show that * is a Choquet expected utility by proving that * satisfies comonotonic independence. for A 1 , . . . , A n such that μ a (A i ) = 1 n for all i. That is,f conditional on A i × B j is E ameasurable and has distribution p j , andĝ conditional on A i × B j is also E a -measurable and has distribution q j for all i, j.
For any N ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, letf N denote the act obtained from f by replacing each row j ∈ N with the corresponding row ofĝ. Hence,f ∅ =f andf {1,...,n} =ĝ etc. Note that since U is an expected utility function, U (p i ) ≥ U (p j ) and U (q i ) ≥ U (q j ) implies U (αp i + (1 − α)q i ) ≥ U (αp j + (1 − α)q j ). Hence,f N andf N are comonotonic for all N, N .
Then, by Axiom 6c, g * * 1 n f * + n−1 n g * implies Repeating the argument with other rows and using transitivity implies g * * f * . It follows that f * * g * implies f * * αf * + (1 − α)g * * g * for every rational α ∈ (0, 1). It then follows from the weak continuity of W that the same holds for every α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, * is a Choquet expected utility preference, let W * be the Choquet expected utility that represents * . Without loss of generality let W * (p) = U (p) for any constant act p ∈ F * .
It follows Theorem 1 that the capacity of every event depends only on its μ b probability. That is, the associated capacity ν can be written as γ • μ b for strictly increasing γ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] such that γ(0) = 0, γ(1) = 1. To conclude the proof we show that γ is continuous. Since γ is strictly increasing, there are only two possible types of discontinuities it can have: Either γ(t) ≥ γ(t ) + ε for all t < t or γ(t ) ≥ γ(t) + ε for all t > t.
Suppose, the former holds for some t (the argument for the other case is symmetric and omitted). 
i=1 v[u(q i )]β i for some p 1 , . . . , p k , q 1 . . . , q k and β i > 0. It follows from the concavity of v that W viewed as a function of (u(p 1 ), . . . , u(p k )) [and hence (u(q 1 ), . . . , u(q k ))] is concave. Then, (iii) follows from the characterization of uncertainty aversion (the proposition on page 582) in Schmeidler [22] .
